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Casenotes
STILL FURTHER ON APPEALS BY THE
STATE IN CRIMINAL CASES
Robb v. State'
State v. Adams2
By JOHN S. STRAHORN, JR.*
In Robb v. State the defendant was charged with man-
slaughter by motor vehicle and was tried therefor and ac-
quitted by a trial magistrate for Prince George's County.
The State, within the required ten days, entered an appeal
from the magistrate's acquittal to the Circuit Court for
Prince George's County. The defendant there filed a plea
of jeopardy, and thus objected to being tried again. The
State demurred to this plea, and the demurrer was sus-
tained. The Circuit Court then tried the defendant and
found a verdict and entered a judgment of guilty. The
defendant entered this appeal to the Court of Appeals which
held: Appeal dismissed. The statute' permitting the State
to appeal from an unsatisfactory decision of a trial magis-
trate, and to have a defendant retried in the trial court
is valid, and from such trial there is no further appeal to
the Court of Appeals, except to test the jurisdiction of the
lower court. The Circuit Court had jurisdiction under the
statute to try the defendant for the crime on appeal from
the acquittal by the trial magistrate, and so the further
appeal by him to the Court of Appeals had to be dismissed.
In State v. Adams there were several indictments against
defendant in the Criminal Court of Baltimore City, for
violations of the gambling laws, where the entire evidence
against him consisted of possession of articles which had
been seized from him at the time of his arrest and under
a questionable search warrant. He challenged the validity
of the warrant, and contended that the evidence had been
* Professor of Law, University of Maryland, and Faculty Editor of
the REVIEW.
1190 Md. 641, 60 A. 2d 211 (1948).
276 A. 2d 575 (Md. 1950). See also State v. Barshack, 80 A. 2d 32 (Md.
1951), dismissing an appeal under the same circumstances as in State v.
Adams.8 Md. Code Supp. (1947), Art. 52, Sees. 13, 13A. As pointed out below,
infra, ns. 26-29, this statute is applicable only to the counties of the State
outside of Baltimore City and special legislation carries out the parallel
idea of concurrent jurisdiction for Baltimore City.
APPEALS BY THE STATE
obtained by unlawful search and seizure, and therefore was
not usable against him under the provisions of the Bouse
Act.' He filed a pre-trial motion to dismiss the case because
of this unlawful search and seizure, but the trial court
ignored the motion and required him to plead, whereupon
he pleaded not guilty, and elected a trial without a jury.
The court received all the evidence in question subject to
exception, and overruled the pre-trial motion, but, at the
conclusion of the testimony, held the arrest, search and
seizure illegal, granted the defendant's motion to strike out
all the evidence that had been admitted in the case, and
then rendered a verdict of not guilty. From judgments
on the verdict the State appealed to the Court of Appeals,
which held: Appeal dismissed. The State has no right to
appeal, lacking statutory authorization not yet provided,
from a verdict and judgment of acquittal in a criminal case
tried in the Circuit or Criminal Court, with or without a
jury.
As the title of this note would indicate, this is the third
time that the REVIEW has treated the problem of appeals by
the State in criminal cases in Maryland. This is because the
question is an important, and still unsettled, one in the
Maryland law. Furthermore, on two other occasions, the
REVIEw has published notes on related matters that bear
on the question of appeals by the State.
It will be noted that the two principal cases now under
consideration are both concerned with appeals by the State,
and also involve the basic problem of the double jeopardy
prohibition, which is an important consideration in any
treatment of the practical problem of such appeals. The
former case applies, and both cases recognize the idea that,
in Maryland law, the prohibition against double jeopardy is
not constitutional, i.e., that there is nothing in the Mary-
land Constitution to prohibit it, and that the Federal Con-
stitutional ban is inapplicable. Indeed, the only Maryland
ban against double jeopardy is the common law rule to
that effect.5 As a consequence the former case holds that
the Legislature has the power to relax the ban, and thus
authorize a procedure which would otherwise come
within any constitutional ban against double jeopardy.
'Md. Code Supp. (1947), Art. 35, Sec. 5.
SSee infra, n. 6, 4 Md. L. Rev. 303, 309, n. 19 (1940), calling attention to
the REVIEW'S editorial-typographical error which had mistakenly ascribed
a double jeopardy clause to the Maryland Constitution in infra, n. 15, 3 Md.
L. Rev. 184, 185 (1939), and also calling attention 'to a similar error in the
Court of Appeals decision in Friend v. State, 175 Md. 352, 356, 2 A. 2d 430,
432 (1938).
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This it has done in the provision for appeal by the State
from acquittals in magistrate's courts, the appeal being
taken to the County Circuit Court. But it has not yet done
so beyond the limited common law scope of appeal by the
State, for trials in the Circuit or Criminal Courts.
The two previous treatments in the REVIEW of the ques-
tion of appeals by the State both involved variations of the
situation in State v. Adams. In all of the three cases the
State was trying to correct an alleged error by the trial
court, whose striking out of all of its tangible evidence
(because obtained under questionable circumstances of
search and seizure) thereby made an acquittal of the defen-
dant inevitable for lack of evidence. The common problem
of the earlier cases and the Adams case is: What can the
State do to get an appellate ruling on the propriety of the
trial court's action in depriving it of the use of the very
evidence it must have in order to obtain a conviction?
In State v. Mariana' the defendant was charged with
gambling, and the principal evidence against him consisted
of exhibits which had been obtained from him under ques-
tionable circumstances of search and seizure, thereby giving
him a possible objection to their use under the Bouse Act.
He filed a pre-trial motion to suppress the articles in evi-
dence at the forthcoming trial, the motion was granted over
the objection of the State, which then went to trial, and the
State being without evidence, the defendant was acquitted.
The State then appealed on the ground that the pre-trial
motion should not have been received and ruled on. The
Court of Appeals reversed and ordered a new trial,' point-
ing out that a previous case8 had decided that the use of a
pre-trial motion to suppress was not the Maryland way of
implementing an objection to illegally obtained evidence,
but that objection to the evidence at the trial was proper.
The defendant-appellee in the Mariana case did not
move to dismiss the appeal, so that while the Court actually
6174 Md. 85, 197 A. 620 (1938), noted in Appeal8 By the State In Criminal
Case8, 4 Md. L. Rev. 303 (1940). This casenote was unsigned, as was the
second one, infra, n. 10. Both were written by Charles C. Atwater, Esq., now
of the Baltimore City Bar, then of the Student Editorial Board of the
REVIEw.
The RwvIEw is not informed whether a new trial was ever held in the
Mariana case, although it is probable that none was held under the cir-
cumstances.
8 Sugarman v. State, 173 Md. 52, 195 A. 2d 324 (1937), noted in Admi8i-
bility of Evidence Obtained By Unlawful Search and Seizure, 2 Md. L. Rev.
147 (1938). The R~mEw's casenote did not give particular attention to the
problem of the procedure, but rather was concerned with the substantive
aspect of the Bouse Act, as the title would indicate.
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entertained an appeal by the State after a judgment of ac-
quittal, the case, as it turns out, does not stand as a prece-
dent tolerating such appeals, because of the absence of
such motion to dismiss raising the point of the propriety of
the State's appeal. In fact, the Court in the Adams case
now being noted, distinguished the Mariana case for this
reason, and distinguished it for another reason in the Rosen
case next to be treated.
In the RviEw's note9 of the Mariana case, much of the
law of appeals by the State in criminal cases was discussed,
and it is not proposed to repeat that discussion here. The
reader is referred to the previous treatment of State v.
Mariana for the basic law of Maryland as to appeals by the
State from acquittals in criminal cases tried in the Circuit
or Criminal Courts. Rather, this note purports to go into
the peculiar problems raised by the two cases under dis-
cussion, with some speculation as to certain possible future
developments that are suggested by their novel aspects,
coupled with other interim developments in the field.
In the second treatment in the REVIEw of the problem,
the later case of State v. Rosen ° was more briefly discussed.
That case was much like the Mariana case, except that
instead of a motion to suppress evidence filed before trial,
it involved a motion to quash a search warrant (the legality
of which was necessary to make the evidence admissible).
This motion was filed after trial, and in fact the search
and seizure warrant had not been applied for until after
the trial had started and the defendants had elected to be
tried together before a court without a jury. The trial
court quashed the search warrant, and the State having
informed the court that it was powerless to proceed, the
parties were then found not guilty, and the State appealed.
The Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal on proper motion
so to do, and held that there was no right in the State to
appeal from a judgment of acquittal.
The State, in the Rosen case, relied on State v. Mariana,
but the Court distinguished it, not so much on the ground
that there had been no motion to dismiss in the Mariana
case, as on the ground that the Mariana case had involved
an error as to something not sustained by statute or prece-
9Supra, n. 6. See also for an exhaustive treatment of the general law of
appeals by the State, ORFIELD, CRIMINAL APPEALS IN AMERICA (1939) 55-76.
Detailed references will be made in later footnotes herein to Mr. Orfield's
excellent treatment of the general law of the matter and of the theoretical
considerations that apply in this field.
"181 Md. 167, 28 A. 2d 829 (1942), noted in Further On Appeals By the
State in Criminal Cases, 7 Md. L. Rev. 364 (1943).
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dent in the State, to wit: the granting of a pre-trial motion
to suppress evidence, instead of excluding the evidence
when offered during the routine trial of the case. In noting
the Rosen case, the REvIEw was critical" of the Court's
basing its decision on that ground, and it is well that in the
Adams case now under discussion, the Court has accepted
the sounder ground of failure to make an objection on the
ground of the incapacity of the State to take an appeal. In
fact, in the Adams case, the Court points out:12
"There was no motion to dismiss the appeal, and the
right to appeal was not mentioned in the opinion. What
was done in the Mariana case cannot operate to over-
rule sub silentio what was decided in the long line of
prior cases; still less can it stand against subsequent
decisions." (then citing the Rosen case and the still
later Lingner case, 3 which will be discussed below).
The other two previous treatments of the field in the
REVIEw have both involved the details of double jeopardy,
and the first one is particularly relevant in connection with
the Robb case under discussion now. This discussion
involved the United States Supreme Court case of Palko v.
Connecticut,'14 in which the Supreme Court held that
nothing in the Federal Constitution forbade the State of
Connecticut to provide for an appeal by the State from an
acquittal or unsatisfactory conviction in the trial court,
after a trial on the merits. It was held that the Federal Bill
of Rights, including the double jeopardy clause, is inappli-
cable to a state action, so that if the state has no inhibition
of its own against double jeopardy, it is permissible for it
to provide for that which would be double jeopardy under
the Federal ban, if the latter were applicable.
In that case, under local procedure, the State had
appealed from a second degree murder conviction, alleg-
ing prejudicial error in excluding evidence, and obtained a
reversal and a new trial, at which the defendant was con-
victed of first degree murder and sentenced to be executed.
On appeal to the Supreme Court, this was affirmed, and this
ruling is the basis for the underlying theme of this discus-
"I bid, 7 Md. L. Rev. 364, 365-6.
2 76 A. 2d 575, 579 (1950).
State v. Lingner, 183 Md. 158, 36 A. 2d 674 (1944).
"302 U. S. 319 (1937), noted in Etent to Which Rights Secured by the
First Bight Amendments to the Federal Constitution Are Protected Against
State Action by the Fourteenth Amendment, 2 Md. L. Rev. 174 (1938). See
also ORFIEMD, op. cit., supra, n. 9, 58.
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sion, that double jeopardy is not a constitutional matter.
The Federal constitution presents no obstacle, and there is
no Maryland constitutional provision, so that there is but a
common law idea subject to being changed by appropriate
legislation, as has been done in the Robb case situation, but
has not yet been done in the Adams case situation.
In the other case which the REVIEw has noted, that of
Crawford v. State,15 a mere internal detail of the idea of
double jeopardy was involved. The defendant shot and
wounded a child and, while the child still languished, the
defendant was tried and acquitted by a magistrate of the
assault with intent to kill. When the child later died the
defendant was then tried for the homicide, was convicted,
and the conviction was affirmed in the face of his plea of
double jeopardy. The Court did not squarely decide
whether it was double jeopardy to try him a second time
for the more serious offense which later accrued, but
rather put it on the narrow ground that there was no juris-
diction in the particular magistrate to try the lesser offense
as he did,'6 so that the acquittal was without jurisdictional
foundation and presented no problem of jeopardy. Thus,
no square ruling on the details of double jeopardy in that
peculiar assault and homicide situation was obtained, and
this case has little bearing on the present discussion of
appeals by the State, although it does share the theme of
double jeopardy.
Turning now to the two cases under discussion, it would
seem that their common theme is that while there is no
Maryland constitutional objection to appeals by the State
in criminal cases, even from verdicts and judgments of ac-
quittal after trial on the merits, this right is still restricted.
Thus, as the law now stands, the right of the State to appeal
in Maryland is limited to the statutory provisions therefor,
or its basic common law privilege, which latter obtains only
if there was no trial on the merits. Under the latter situa-
tion, the State is limited to appealing, in effect, only from
rulings of the trial court which prevent it from going to trial
on the merits at all. The situation in the Robb case seems
to provide the only vestige of an appeal as such from an
174 Md. 175, 197 A. 866 (1938), noted in Effect of Acquittal for Assault
on Trial for Murder When Victim Subsequently Dies, 3 Md. L. Rev. 184
(1939).
16 This was on the ground that the particular charge before the magistrate
was for assault with intent to kill, whereas the magistrates of Baltimore
City may only try for simple assault under Baltimore City Charter (1938),
Section 724, now Baltimore City Charter (1949), Section 410.
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actual acquittal, and that is limited to appeals from County
magistrates to courts of record, so that there is as yet no
provision for State appeals from criminal trials in courts
of record to the Court of Appeals of Maryland.
The common law scope of appeal 17 seems to be limited
to such rulings as (1) the granting of a defendant's pre-trial
motion" in the nature of a demurrer to the indictment,
whereby no trial is held unless the ruling be reversed on
appeal and the case remanded; or (2) the granting of the
defendant's motion 9 in the nature of a plea in abatement
after evidence has been heard on the motion or plea. It was
pointed out in the Lingner case2 ° that there can be no appeal
if, after the State's demurrer to the defendant's plea in
abatement is overruled, the State refuses to traverse the
plea and goes to trial on the merits. There cannot then be
an appeal from the overruling of the demurrer to the pleas
in abatement.2'
The point of this case seems to be that a ruling favorable
to the defendant on the traverse of the plea (now contest
of the motion) would be tantamount to sustaining a demur-
rer to the indictment (now granting such a motion) and
would preclude the State from going to trial and would
entitle the State to appeal for having been denied the right
to go to trial. Thus it is apparent that, lacking further
legislation, the State has no appeal from any adverse rul-
ing made at a trial on the merits, although it leads to an ac-
quittal, perhaps unjustly. And, of course, it has always
been true that all errors of trial judges, adverse to the
State, committed in the course of a trial, whether by letting
in erroneous defense evidence, or keeping out valid state's
evidence, or granting defense prayers which state bad law,
or rejecting state prayers which state good law, and the
like, go unredressed by any right of appeal on the State's
part.
The Robb case has certain interesting implications. The
statute allowing the State to appeal from an acquittal by a
trial magistrate, equally with the defendant's appealing
from a conviction, is the so-called "concurrent jurisdiction"
17 On this, see ORFELD, op. cit., supra, n. 9, 61.
8Criminal Rules of Practice and Procedure (1950), Rule 3.
19 Ibid.
2 State v. Llngner, 183 Md. 158, 36 A. 2d 674 (1944), supra, n. 13.
2Under the new rules, supra, n. 18, there would be no such demurrer,
but merely a contest of the defendant's motion in the nature of a plea in
abatement.
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statute,22 whereby, lacking more specific or local laws2"
for certain crimes, crimes of medium gravity24 may be
tried either in the magistrate's court or in the Circuit
Court, depending on the wishes of the parties. Under this
statute, when a defendant is brought to a magistrate,
charged with a non-penitentiary misdemeanor, he may
elect to be tried by the magistrate or he may "pray a
jury trial" which means he will be tried in a court of
record by the more dignified procedure there available.
Likewise, the State may pray a jury trial equally with the
defense, and this privilege parallels the equal privilege of
the State to appeal from an acquittal, as the defendant may
appeal from a conviction, which is the principal point in
the Robb case. The statute for the Counties is mutual in
both respects, with reference to either party insisting on a
trial at the higher level in the first instance, and with re-
spect to either party appealing from an unsatisfactory
result where both were agreeable to have the first trial in
the magistrate's court. Certainly, now that the Court has
ruled in favor of appeal by the State from an actual trial
and acquittal by the magistrate, there can be no doubt
about the less questionable privilege of the State to insist
on having the first trial in the jury type court, equally
with that of the defendant to insist upon it in his favor.
It might be remarked that the Maryland practice here
recognized, of both allowing the State to appeal from a
magistrate's acquittal, and to pray a jury trial equally with
the defendant, reflects an attitude found throughout the
2 Md. Code Supp. (1947), Art. 52, Secs. 13, 13A, supra, n. 3, for the coun-
ties, exclusive of Baltimore City. The comparable, although not similar,
Baltimore City provision is found in Baltimore City Charter (1949), Sec-
tions 410-411, 8upra, n. 16.
Prior to 1943, various local and special laws had their own peculiar
provisions for concurrent jurisdiction of magistrates, praying jury trials,
and for appeals from trials by magistrates, which, even in the Counties,
were at variance with Md. Code Supp. (1947), Art. 52, Sec. 13, ibid. By
amendment of that year, Md. Laws 1943, Ch. 487, it was provided that the
provisions of Section 13 should apply to all criminal trials before a magis-
trate in -the counties (except motor vehicle cases) whether enacted before
or after, unless the law specifically exempted the practice by reference.
Query, does this go so far as to apply to magistrate's trials under city ordi-
nances which do not provide appeals, and does it thus repeal the rule of
the case of Norwood v. Wiseman, 141 Md. 696, 119 A. 688 (1922), involving
the non-appealability from magistrate's decisions under ordinances of the
Town of Westernport.
As pointed out below, the County statute, Md. Code Supp. (1947), Art.
52, Secs. 13, 13A, makes the test in terms of non-penitentiary misdemeanors
not otherwise provided for, to determine the scope of the concurrent juris-
diction. Thus felonies and misdemeanors that carry penitentiary sentences
do not come within the scope of the concurrent jurisdiction in the counties.
In the City the statute allows concurrent jurisdiction only for a small group
of enumerated petty offenses.
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country in the decisions of other states, based on the ration-
ale that the public has an interest in serious criminal
cases being tried by a jury in the first instance. Thus,
some states have a rule25 that there cannot even be a waiver
of trial by jury in cases where the defendant is entitled to
demand it.
We are accustomed, here in Maryland, to rather free
waiver of jury trials, as witness both the concurrent juris-
diction statute, and our practice of allowing waiver of jury
trial in courts where juries are available. However, it may
be that the local practice of allowing the State to pray a
jury or to appeal to a jury type of court from a magis-
trate's acquittal somewhat reflects this public interest in
having a jury trial where that would subdue dissatisfac-
tion with criminal justice. Or, it may merely be an in-
terest in having the case tried, with or without a jury, in
a type of court where a jury is available.
It should be noted that there is an essential difference
between the statute2" dealt with in the Robb case which
applies only in the counties, and the different, local statute27
for Baltimore City. While both statutes recognize the
idea of concurrent jurisdiction, with the implications set
out above, yet the one applicable to the counties has the
provision under discussion, for the appeal by the State
from a magistrate's acquittal, while the one for Baltimore
City apparently does not have such a provision. Both have
the mutual provision for a prayer for a jury trial either
by the State or the defense.
This difference may be explained in terms of the rela-
tively limited scope of the Baltimore City concurrent juris-
diction statute. It does not apply to as many crimes of
medium gravity as does the one for the counties, involved
in the Robb case. The particular crimes which do come
within the Baltimore City concurrent jurisdiction statute
are specially enumerated." This is to be explained by the
fact that the Criminal Court of Baltimore City is in con-
tinuous session throughout the whole year, so that there
is not the same need for conferring trial jurisdiction (with
2 Oppenheim, Waiver of Trial by Jury in Criminal Ca8e8, 25 Mich. L. Rev.
695, 707, et seq. (1927).
0Md. Code Supp. (1947), Art. 52, Secs. 13, 13A.
2 Baltimore City Charter (1949), Secs. 410, 411, formerly Baltimore City
Charter (1938), Secs. 724, 725.
s Ibid. The petty larceny statute, Md. Code Supp. (1947), Art. 27, Sec. 388,
which provides concurrent jurisdiction in theft cases under Twenty-five
Dollars, was amended by Md. Laws 1941, Ch. 630, to include Baltimore City
within its provisions, and it is now State-wide.
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c6nsent of the parties) on the lower magistrate's courts,
inasmuch as a prompt trial may be obtained in a court of
record in the City. Thus, there is not the danger of the
accused being held in jail or under bail for a considerable
period of time awaiting the next session of the local crimi-
nal court, as would be the case in the counties, where the
Circuit Courts meet infrequently. This is commonly under-
stood to be the reason why the Baltimore City concurrent
jurisdiction statute is not as broad in scope as that for the
counties, and why a special rule should obtain for Balti-
more City. Thus, because only crimes of really petty sig-
nificance are triable by the magistrate's courts in Baltimore
City, there may not be as much reason for allowing the
State to appeal from a (perhaps unjust) acquittal by a
city magistrate as in the case of a simliar acquittal by a
county magistrate, who has more extensive jurisdiction
(with consent) of medium type criminal offenses.
As between the Baltimore City special provision and
the general one for the counties, there is also another in-
teresting distinction. In the City, as has been decided by
the Court of Appeals,29 the cases where either party prays
a jury trial in the first instance must clear through the
grand jury, which must then indict in order to lay the
foundation for the first trial in the Criminal Court. On the
other hand, because of the different wording of the general
statute for the counties, when a jury trial is prayed, the
trial in the Circuit Court is held on the warrant or infor-
mation filed before the magistrate, and it is not necessary
for the grand jury to indict in the meanwhile in order for
this first trial to be had. One can only speculate as to
whether this distinction is an historical accident or is also
to be explained in terms of Baltimore City's Criminal Court
being in continuous session.30
Another aspect of the Robb case situation concerns the
possibility of a further appeal to the Court of Appeals after
an acquittal by the magistrate is appealed to the court of
record and a conviction is there obtained. The traditional
rule is that upon conviction by a magistrate, and an appeal
taken to the Circuit or Criminal Court, the case is con-
cluded by the decision there, and that there may not be a
,2 Callan v. State, 156 Md. 459, 463, 144 A. 350 (1929).
80 An interesting detail of the provision for the counties, Md. Code Supp.
(1947), Art. 52, Secs. 13, 13A, is that there may be an appeal by the defen-
dant, after a conviction by a trial magistrate, even where he pleaded guilty




second, further appeal to the Court of Appeals, save bn
questions of jurisdiction, or constitutionality." This rule
has long since been accepted in the case of a conviction by
a magistrate, followed by a second conviction or affirmance
by the Circuit or Criminal Court. But now that the Robb
case reminds us that the State can appeal from an acquittal,
the question seems to arise, would it not be fair then to
let the defendant appeal to the Court of Appeals from his
first conviction, which may occur in the Circuit Court of
one of the Counties.
Of course, it might be argued that a defendant, anxious
to preserve his right to go to the Court of Appeals from
such a conviction, should pray a jury trial in the first in-
stance, and thus stand his first trial in the County Circuit
Court. This would entitle him to take the case to the Court
of Appeals on the first appeal in the matter, and so his
election to stand trial in the magistrate's court could then
be regarded as an assumption of the risk that the State
would appeal from an acquittal, thus precluding him from
a further appeal to the higher tribunal. Of course, it would
take legislation to provide for such a second appeal in this
unusual situation of the Robb case. The Robb case itself
raised the point by dismissing the attempted appeal, point-
ing out that it could be entertained only for purposes of
testing the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court, and that the
Circuit Court did have jurisdiction to try the appeal in the
case.
Related to the above problem of a further appeal to the
Court of Appeals (after a magistrate's trial has been ap-
pealed to the Circuit Court) is the following: Can there
be an appeal to the Court of Appeals (by the defendant)
from a conviction found by the Circuit or Criminal Court
on a trial there held, following a prayer for a jury trial in
a case originally initiated before a magistrate. Until re-
cently there was some doubt whether there could be such
an appeal (as clearly was so in cases initiated by indict-
ment, or cases beyond the concurrent jurisdiction). How-
ever, by an amendment to the statute for the Counties d 2
and a decision of the Court of Appeals as to the City pro-
cedure, in the Brack case,"3 it is now clear that there may
14 The Robb case, the first one now being noted, accepts this rule, and ex-
tends it to denial of a further appeal from a first conviction found on the
State's appeal from a magistrate's acquittal.
12 Md. Code Supp. (1947), Art. 52, Sec. 13A, as it was amended by Md.
Laws 1945, Ch. 845.
1Brack v. State, 187 Md. 542, 51 A. 2d 173 (1947).
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be such a first appeal from a first trial (either on the war-
rant or information in the Counties, or after interim grand
jury indictment in the City), when a case within the con-
current jurisdiction is initiated before a magistrate and a
jury trial is prayed. It would be unfortunate were it other-
wise, for then the accident of initiating the case before the
magistrate or in the grand jury would determine the right
to appeal exactly the same type of case.
One further point is suggested by the Robb case, to wit:
Is it desirable to propose legislation for extending the
State's right of appeal from a magistrate's acquittal, to in-
clude an appeal from an acquittal by a Circuit or Criminal
Court to the Court of Appeals of Maryland? 4 If appeal
from a magistrate's acquittal to the Circuit Court is desir-
able, why not the further step? This would involve adopt-
ing the Connecticut practice, which we have seen sanc-
tioned in Palka v. Connecticut. It may be that a distinction
can be recognized, and that while it is desirable to have
appeals from magistrate's acquittals, it is not as desirable
to have appeals from acquittals by courts of record in first
trials there held, for the reason that it is more likely that
a trial magistrate, being less learned in the law, may arrive
at an improper and unjust acquittal. Because of this, so-
ciety may be more prejudiced by acquittals by trial magis-
trates than by acquittals by courts of record, where the
procedure is more certain and the training of the judge is
better. Distinguish, of course, the problem of appeals from
acquittals as merely a moot matter, to be discussed below
in another connection, as the present discussion is con-
cerned with a definitive appeal that would result in a new
trial and possible later conviction. Distinguish also the
point to be discussed below, of appeals from directed ver-
dicts, where the State does not have an opportunity to take
the case to the jury, or from post-trial rulings tantamount
thereto.
The Adams case poses the specific problem of what can
the State do when the trial court's ruling completely de-
prives it of its entire available evidence to obtain a con-
viction, so that it might as well never have instituted any
action. This problem is involved in common with the
earlier Mariana and Rosen cases. Of course, the trial court's
possible erroneous rejection of the entire body of tangible
evidence that the State has mustered to obtain a conviction
" On the desirability of allowing appeal from an acquittal by a court of
record, after a trial on the merits, see OaFiELD, op. cit., supra, n. 9, 69.
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is but another instance of the trial court's committing
errors on points of evidence to the State's disfavor, such
as by excluding proper State evidence, or admitting im-
proper defense evidence. The question of evidence ob-
tained by search and seizure is but an aspect of the overall
problem of the State's being relatively impotent when the
trial court commits an error to its disfavor in the routine
trial of the case.
Thus, because of the frequence of the problem and the
severe impact on the State's case, it may be, as witness the
three Maryland appeals in the matter, that the problem
deserves a positive correction, either by rule of court or
legislation, and thought should be given to the desirability
of changing the rule.
The problem arises under the Bouse Act, 5 the Mary-
land statutory version of the idea that the evidence ob-
tained by illegal search and seizure is therefore inadmis-
sible in misdemeanor cases, and its application has been
quite extensive in gambling, conspiracy, and similar cases.
This statute accepts the federal rule of the Weeks case,36
with the procedural difference that in the federal practice
a pre-trial motion to suppress the questionable evidence is
the way of raising the question, while in the State practice
a routine objection to the offer of the evidence at the trial
is the manner of handling it. That is the crux of the prob-
lem now under discussion, which has culminated in the
Adams case, and the Federal practice may offer a possible
solution of the dilemma of the Adams and earlier cases
about appeals by the State, from the trial court's possibly
erroneous deprivation of the State of all of its evidence by
ruling in favor of the defense contention that it had been
illegally seized. Thus an acceptance, either by rule of
court or legislation, of the Federal practice of using pre-
trial motions to resolve the question of whether the evi-
dence was seized by illegal search and seizure and is proper
to be used at the later trial, in lieu of our present practice
of ruling on the matter only in the course of the trial on the
merits as on any other offer of evidence by the State, when
objected to by the defense, might solve the difficulty.
To implement this idea, it would have to be provided,
inter alia, that the State would have to give advance notice
to the defense of its intention to use any tangible exhibits
that might have been obtained improperly, so that the
8 Md. Code Supp. (1947), Art. 35, See. 5.
Weeks v. U. S., 232 U. S. 383 (1914).
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defense would have the opportunity to make such a pre-
trial motion. Of course, even that would not be entirely
necessary for it could be made optional for the State to give
such notice in order to call for a pre-trial motion, or else
run the risk of not being able to appeal from an adverse
ruling when it offers the evidence at the trial itself with-
out such advance warning.
Furthermore, such a procedure would imply a rule that
if the trial court grants the defendant's pre-trial motion and
suppresses all of the State's evidence, then the State could
submit to something in the nature of an involuntary non
pros or a dismissal of the prosecution, so that there would
be no trial on the merits. Further, provision should then be
made for an appeal from such judgment, based on the
alleged error in the trial court's having granted the motion
to suppress, followed by dismissal, and thus there could be
an appeal by the State from what would be, in effect, not
letting the case go to trial, and the present rule of no appeal
by the State from an acquittal after trial on the merits
would still be preserved.
This would seem to be a plausible solution of the prob-
lem, inasmuch as it would set the matter up so that the
alleged error in granting the motion to suppress the evi-
dence would have the same effect as the granting of a
motion in the nature of a demurrer to an indictment, or
the granting of a motion in the nature of a plea in abate-
ment, both of which, under the present practice do prevent
the State from going to trial at all and entitle it to an appeal
from such a drastic ruling. As has been pointed out before
in the REVIEw, and contended for by the State in certain of
its appeals, the substantial effect of suppressing all of the
State's evidence by a ruling under the Bouse Act is to keep
it from going to trial at all. It has been seriously argued
even under the present practice that the State should be
allowed an appeal from such an adverse ruling which, while
it may be made in the course of a trial, has the ultimate
impact of not letting them have a chance to win at all. So it
is that some such practice as suggested above might resolve
the dilemma and, without going further in the direction of
novel appeal by the State, still would solve the ever-recur-
ring problem of questionable rulings by trial courts under
the Bouse Act at a reasonable level.
If it be desirable to adopt some such pre-trial practice as
outlined above, how should it be done, by rule of court
under the rule-making power, or by legislation? Language
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of the Court of Appeals in the Adams case87 suggests that
only the latter is possible, but it must be remembered, rule-
making under the Constitutional sanction is a species of
legislation, and also that the Court was speaking of the
permitting of an appeal from an acquittal in a trial on the
merits.
Providing for that might be thought a too-extensive use
of the rule-making power, in that "extending the scope of
appeal" is more a legislative than a judicial function. But,
would it be as much so merely to provide another pre-trial
procedure, consistent with present ideas as to the "scope
of appeal" from existent pre-trial rulings that also frustrate
the trial being held at all? Even conceding that it is not
proper, short of legislative enactment, to go as far as the
Connecticut practice, yet it would seem plausible to use the
rule-making power to change from exclusion at trial to
pre-trial motion and dismissal as a way of solving the
Adams case and kindred problems.
The whole discussion of appeals by the State to test
routine errors committed by the trial court against it in
the course of the trial on the merits has to keep in mind the
inevitable idea that prevails as long as the present pro-
cedure remains unchanged. This is that because the State
is impotent to appeal from an acquittal after trial on the
merits in a court of record, the trial judge's errors, even
though they may be multitudinous, adverse to the State,
go uncorrected, whether committed by excluding its proper
evidence, or admitting the defendant's improper evidence,
or by rejecting its proper prayers on the law, or accepting
the defendant's improper ones.8" This is inescapable, so
long as we lack any more extensive system of appeal by
the State from an acquittal in a criminal case tried in a
court of record, as is now the situation. As a result, many
trial judges tend to "lean over backwards" in favor of the
defendant, thus insuring against reversal on appeal, and
thus improving their "batting average" in the appellate
87 In the Adams opinion, 76 A. 2d 575, 579, the Court mentioned, that while
reference was made in argument to the Criminal Rules of Practice and
Procedure (1950), the Attorney General did not contend that these rules
authorized the particular appeal. Further, the Court cautioned: "If they
did, it would be necessary for us to consider the distinction between power
'to regulate and revise the practice and procedure' and power to abridge,
enlarge or modify substantive rights, and specifically power (or lack of
power) of a court to enlarge or restrict the jurisdiction conferred by a
statute." (Followed by citations.) Finally, the Court concluded: "If a
broader right of review is necessary In the interest of criminal justice, it
must be granted by the legislature."
On this, see OIVELD, Op. Cit., supra, n. 9, 73.
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court with respect to the number of times they are affirmed
or reversed. So it is that many trial rulings are observed
by interested lawyers and students in the trial of criminal
cases which would probably be reversed, had they been
made against the defendant instead of against the State.
In this connection, two things should be noted. One is
that under the Maryland practice"9 it is permissible for the
Court of Appeals to note exceptions by the State to the
trial court's ruling where there has been a conviction, fol-
lowed by an appeal by the defendant, who alone has such
right after a trial on the merits. This rarely used provision
allows the Court of Appeals also to notice the exceptions
by the State to rulings adverse to it, primarily for the
benefit of the trial court in a new trial, if one is to be had.
So, to a limited extent, it may be possible to obtain such
advisory rulings on the law where the State has suffered
adverse rulings at the hand of the trial court, but this can
only be so when the case led to conviction and the defendant
himself takes the appeal. Otherwise, under present rules,
the State could not take an appeal if an acquittal had
resulted.
Further in this connection, a few American states4 ° have
the practice of allowing appeals by the State from an acquit-
tal in a trial on the merits, but only as a moot matter to
get the law straightened out for the future, and without
power to get a new trial and possible conviction of the de-
fendant, as is allowed in Connecticut. The State of Indiana4
is typical of this compromise practice, whereby there may
be a limited appeal by the State for the purpose only of
getting an advisory ruling on the law for the future, but
without power to get a retrial. It might be that it would be
desirable for Maryland to adopt this compromise practice,
if it is not thought desirable to go so far as the Connecticut
practice of complete new trial with its possible conviction.
This latter we have yet adopted only for magistrate's trials
and acquittals, and have not yet adopted for Circuit or
Criminal Court trials and acquittals, as pointed out above.
One final point of speculation is relevant in the light of
recent developments in Maryland criminal procedure. By
rule of court going into effect on January First, 1950,42
"Md. Code (1939), Art. 5, Sec. 86, as interpreted in State v. King, 124
Md. 491, 496, 92 A. 1041 (1915). See also, ORFIELD, op. cit., supra, n. 9, 64.
See OPRFIELD, op. cit., supra, n. 9, 65-68.
,1 State v. Robbins, 221 Ind. 125, 46 N. E. 2d 691 (1943).
"Criminal Rules of Practice and Procedure (1950), Rule 6(b). This Is
now Rule 5A, after the amendments of February 15, 1951, infra, n. 45.
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strengthened by a Constitutional amendment" and cover-
ing legislation44 in the Fall of 1950, and an amended rule of
court promulgated in early 1951, 45 the Maryland criminal
procedure has adopted for the first time in history the idea
of a directed verdict of not guilty in criminal cases, where
the trial court finds that the State has produced insufficient
evidence to sustain a verdict of guilty. Prior to these de-
velopments there was no such thing as a directed verdict
of not guilty and there was absolutely no appellate review
of the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain a verdict. But
these developments have radically changed that, so that
today we do have the practice of granting a directed ver-
dict of not guilty at the motion of the defendant, either at
the close of the State's case, or at the close of the whole
case as may be, so that if the court feels that the evidence
is insufficient, the jury has no discretion in the matter
under the amended rule, and the clerk enters a verdict of
not guilty, upon which judgment of not guilty will follow.
The question now arises, and has not yet been solved,
either by rule of court or by legislation: Should the State
be allowed to appeal from the granting of such directed
verdict of not guilty and thus get a ruling from the Court
of Appeals as to whether the trial court was correct in
finding a dearth of sufficient evidence to sustain a verdict?46
In some ways the problem is analogous to that of the
Adams and earlier cases, for that by "taking the case away
from the jury", the State has been frustrated somewhat in
the same way as when it is deprived of using all of its avail-
able evidence. It was argued above that the latter is tanta-
mount to not letting the case go to the jury at all.
While the practice of judgment N.O.V. in criminal cases
has not yet been adopted either by rule or legislation, the
problem would be the same if the N.O.V. practice is ever
adopted in criminal cases. It would have the same implica-
tions on the point of criminal appeals: Should the State also
be allowed to appeal from the granting of judgment of not
guilty N.O.V., as from the granting of a directed verdict?
It would be in effect akin to not letting them go to trial to
'aMd. Laws 1949, Ch. 407, amending Md. Const. (1867), Art. 15, Sec. 5.
Adopted at the November, 1950, election.
" Md. Laws 1949, Ch. 596, adding Md. Code Supp. (1947), Art. 27, Sec.
655A. This was provided to take effect upon the adoption of the Constitu-
tional amendment, 8upra, n. 43.
,5 Criminal Rules of Practice and Procedure (amended February 15, 1951),
Rule 5A.
" For speculation about this problem, In advance of Maryland's adopting
the practice of directed verdicts in criminal cases, see supra, n. 6, 4 Md. L.
Rev. 303, 310-11, and supra, n. 10, 7 Md. L. Rev. 364, 366.
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the jury, and somewhat like not letting them go to trial
at all.
Then, as for directed verdicts and possible N.O.V. rul-
ings, should the State also be allowed a novel appeal from
the granting of a new trial or a motion in arrest of judg-
ment?47 Some states do permit this, as they likewise permit
the State to appeal to the highest court from a reversal
of a conviction by an intermediate appellate one.4" This
latter point is, of course, no problem in Maryland which
has only one level of appellate court.
To the extent that a new trial follows the granting of a
motion therefor or a motion in arrest, it might be said that
there is less need for allowing the State an appeal, for that
they are not as much frustrated as by a directed verdict
or the granting of a verdict N.O.V. where that practice is
used. These do terminate the prosecution and amount to
jeopardy, where the granting of a new trial or a motion in
arrest with the possibility of a new trial gives the State
still a chance to obtain a conviction, and so the argument
for the State's appeal is not so pressing.49
On these points the writer of this note takes no par-
ticular stand, as the purpose is merely to call attention to
the problems, and to relate them to the problem of the
Adams case. Just as in discussing the Adams case, it was
suggested that depriving the State of all of its evidence at
the trial itself, or before the trial as the case may be, is
tantamount to not letting them go to trial at all as when a
motion in the nature of a demurrer, or a motion in the
nature of a plea in abatement is honored at the behest of the
defendant, so, it could be argued that granting a motion for
directed verdict is likewise tantamount to not letting them
go to trial at all. There is the same policy argument that
an appeal by the State should be allowed.
There again, the question is, which type of appeal should
it be? Should it allow a complete reversal with new trial
ordered, or should it merely be an appeal as a moot matter
'7 On this see ORFIELD, op. cit., supra, n. 9, 58, 64.
See ibid, 68.
With reference to appeals from acquittals in non-jury cases in courts
of record, the problem is more difficult, for that it would be hard to dis-
tinguish between the trial judge's acquitting because he felt the evidence
was insufficient to entitle him as a jury to consider the matter, and his
acquitting because he felt that the balance of the evidence was in favor of
acquittal. It may be that there is less reason for advocating an appeal by
the State from an acquittal by a judge without a jury than from an
acquittal in a jury case where there is a directed verdict, or a judgment
N.O.V., or a new trial or motion In arrest of judgment granted.
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for the advice of courts in future cases of the same nature,
as was discussed above.5 0
On this and on other points of appeals by the State, it
might be argued that, either in the Adams case situation, or
in that of the directed verdict, a defendant who has asserted
either the Bouse Act rule of illegal search and seizure, or
the dearth of the State's evidence in order to keep from
having his case heard by a jury, should run the risk of
having to litigate in the Court of Appeals and then stand
trial again. Should he not make a choice between asserting
the Bouse Act and/or the dearth of the State's evidence, as
a way of frustrating the prosecution without getting to the
jury, or standing trial with them. If he makes his motion
under the Bouse Act or for a directed verdict, perhaps he
should be prepared to face a second trial if he wins too
easily in the trial court, and the appellate court feels he
should not have won there.
Particularly, under the Bouse Act, is that argument
plausible, for that it would probably be safe to state that
nine-tenths of the defendants who assert the Bouse Act,
and move to exclude evidence obtained from them, are
probably guilty, and are merely taking refuge behind an
exclusionary statute that is of debatable evidential policy
anyhow. Certainly, as to that group, there is no unfairness
in forcing them to face the prospect of another trial after
having to defend an appeal, or let it go by default, when the
trial court has temporarily ruled in their favor incorrectly.
Thus there may be a certain parallel between the idea
of appeal by the State from an adverse ruling on illegally
obtained evidence, which is the crux of the matter in the
Adams and earlier cases, and the speculation about possible
future appeals by the State from the granting of directed
verdicts in all criminal cases, under the newly promulgated
rules of criminal procedure, which provide such procedure
for the first time in Maryland legal history.
In conclusion, it might be pointed out that the basic idea
of the ban on double jeopardy, be it constitutional or merely
common law rule, as in Maryland, is to prevent adminis-
trative tyranny in harassing the individual unnecessarily
under established rules of law. To the extent to which an
established rule of law may provide in advance for two
or more proceedings about the same thing, the individual
is not harassed any more than he would be by a single pro-
cedure which entails the composite consequences of two
Supra, ns. 40, 41.
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separate ones. The essential protection is against individual
whim and caprice in pursuing the citizen too often for the
same thing.
But, is there anything wrong, within the framework of
this policy, in allowing the State further to pursue the
given single proceeding to correct possible errors com-
mitted at the behest of the individual himself who is assert-
ing the protection against double jeopardy? When we think
it through, if the defendant on trial himself makes a choice
to assert a certain rule or a certain objection to the State
proceeding against him, should he not run the risk that the
trial judge who rules in the matter too readily finds in his
favor, and run the further risk that the State will appeal
to get that corrected so that justice may be done.
Essentially, an appeal by the State under orderly pro-
cedure is not double jeopardy, but is merely a continuance
of the litigation, and a continuance made necessary because
the one who claims the protection of the jeopardy rule has
himself invoked the danger of further proceedings by mak-
ing some objection to the State's way of proceeding in the
lower trial. Perhaps the Supreme Court's acceptance of the
outright complete appeal by the State under Connecticut
practice, and the Maryland Court of Appeals indication
that there is no constitutional objection, but that statutory
authorization is merely required, both reflect this idea, that
while preserving the essential theme of double jeopardy,
an orderly appeal by the State to correct errors in favor of
the defense is just as plausible as an appeal by the defense
to correct errors in favor of the State. It remains to be
seen whether by rule of court, or by legislation, further
clarification of the local question of appeal by the State in
criminal cases will be obtained.
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